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Bacterial quorum sensing is the communication that takes place between bacteria as they se-
crete certain molecules into the intercellular medium that later get absorbed by the secreting cells
themselves and by others. Depending on cell density, this uptake has the potential to alter gene
expression and thereby affect global properties of the community. We consider the case of multiple
bacterial species coexisting, referring to each one of them as a genotype and adopting the usual
denomination of the molecules they collectively secrete as public goods. A crucial problem in this
setting is characterizing the coevolution of genotypes as some of them secrete public goods (and pay
the associated metabolic costs) while others do not but may nevertheless benefit from the available
public goods. We introduce a network model to describe genotype interaction and evolution when
genotype fitness depends on the production and uptake of public goods. The model comprises a
random graph to summarize the possible evolutionary pathways the genotypes may take as they
interact genetically with one another, and a system of coupled differential equations to character-
ize the behavior of genotype abundance in time. We study some simple variations of the model
analytically and more complex variations computationally. Our results point to a simple trade-off
affecting the long-term survival of those genotypes that do produce public goods. This trade-off
involves, on the producer side, the impact of producing and that of absorbing the public good. On
the non-producer side, it involves the impact of absorbing the public good as well, now compounded
by the molecular compatibility between the producer and the non-producer. Depending on how
these factors turn out, producers may or may not survive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bacterial quorum sensing (QS) is the general denomi-
nation for a variety of mechanisms whereby bacteria com-
municate with one another by the secretion and uptake of
molecules that get diffused in the intercellular medium.
The absorption of such molecules by the cells is important
for the regulation of some genes and thus affects survival
and successful proliferation, as well as many functional
traits, depending on cell density. These include a bacte-
rial species’ propensity to establish symbioses or to ag-
gregate into biofilms, and also its virulence and motility.
Although bacterial QS has been around as a research
topic for about five decades, only much more recently
has sufficient evidence accumulated. Interest in it is now
widespread and a number of useful reviews are available
[1–6]. Whereas initial interest was sparked by the cu-
rious phenomenon of bioluminescence arising in certain
marine bacteria [7, 8], the current focus is on the role of
QS in the immunological effects of the mammalian gut
∗ valmir@cos.ufrj.br
microbiome [9, 10] and in combating bacterial virulence
[11, 12].
When only one single species is involved in bacte-
rial QS, a cell’s uptake, though comprising mainly the
molecules that the cell itself secretes, may also include
those of the other cells nearly indistinguishably. Such
molecules are called autoinducers, in allusion to the fact
that they act as gene regulators for the species. In set-
tings allowing for multiple species, it is in principle con-
ceivable that the autoinducers secreted by members of
a species be absorbable also by those of another. De-
pending on the species involved, the autoinducers they
exchange can be expected to affect cells of different
species differently, perhaps acting as proper autoinducers
in some cases and simply as sources of nutrients or even
toxicity in others. A cell’s secretions, moreover, may in-
clude molecules other than the ones directly involved in
autoinduction. Commonly, all secreted molecules are col-
lectively referred to as public goods (cf., e.g., [6]). In evo-
lutionary terms, and depending on the metabolic costs
involved, the production and uptake of public goods can
affect a cell’s fitness significantly.
Despite the much earlier developments in the field, bac-
terial QS seems to have been the object of mathematical
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2modeling for no longer than about two decades. Many
of the modeling efforts have counted on the close par-
ticipation of researchers involved with experimentation,
resulting in detailed analytical accounts of specific QS
processes [4], including the combinatorial response to in-
tercellular signaling [13]. Others have taken a somewhat
more distanced stance and addressed, e.g., transitions in
bacterial QS [14], and biofilm [15] and pattern [16, 17]
formation. Still others have taken up the basic tenets
of QS and sought to characterize higher-level phenomena
occurring not only in bacteria but also in other systems
in which QS can be said to play a central role. Such phe-
nomena include synchronization in networks [18], oscil-
lations in coupled systems [19], the appearance of dense
aggregates of active particles [20], and phase separation
in colloidal mixtures [21]. To the best of our knowledge,
each of these models has considered one single bacterial
species, taking diversity into account only insofar as it
stems from a few of that species’ strains.
Here we introduce a model of bacterial QS that focuses
on how multiple species coexist and evolve in the pres-
ence of the public goods they produce. In order to avoid
the many complications involved in bacterial taxonomy
[22], we henceforth refer to genotypes as the basic units
of diversity. Given two genotypes, one of them might
be considered merely a strain of the other or they might
both refer to totally distinct species. In our model, all
possible genotypes of a given length are considered con-
comitantly. The complete QS system is represented by
a random graph whose nodes stand for genotypes and
whose edges exist with probabilities that aim to reflect
the mutations that occur as cells undergo binary fission
(the most common mechanism of bacterial proliferation,
though several others exist [23, 24]) and horizontal gene
transfer (HGT, the transfer of genetic material between
individuals [25]). These probabilities are parameterized
so that sampling from the random graph may result in
a graph with more or fewer edges and therefore more or
less far-reaching effects of localized random variation.
In addition to the structural component given by this
random graph, our model includes a system of cou-
pled differential equations describing how the genotypes’
abundances vary with time. These equations depend on
the same parameterization as the random graph. Cru-
cially, they also depend on which genotypes are producers
of public goods, as well as on whether and how absorp-
tion affects each individual genotype. All these aspects
of public-good production and uptake contribute to each
genotype’s fitness in the QS system and can be quantified
in such a way that a great variety of global configurations
can be studied.
This model continues earlier work [26] in which we
added network structure to the so-called quasispecies
models of the dynamics of prebiotic molecules and RNA
viruses [27–32], and also work in which we modeled
the network dynamics of autoimmunity and immunod-
eficiency [33, 34] and of the evolution of eukaryotic cellu-
lar division [35]. We now proceed by giving the model’s
details in Sec. II and analyzing a special case thereof in
Sec. III. Results are given in Sec. IV and discussed in
Sec. V. We conclude in Sec. VI and give directions for
further analysis in the Appendix.
II. MODEL
We represent each bacterial gene by a sequence of B
binary digits (0’s or 1’s), each standing for a nucleotide.
A bacterial genotype is represented by a sequence of L
binary digits, provided L ≥ B and that L is a multiple
of B. A genotype is then viewed as a sequence of L/B
genes. Such representations are of course oversimplistic
in more than one sense, but even so they provide the
necessary means to model the two main sources of varia-
tion in bacterial genotypes, viz., mutations during binary
fission (at the level of the nucleotide) and HGT (at the
level of the gene). Henceforth we use N to denote the set
of all 2L genotypes. Genotypes are numbered 0 through
2L − 1.
Our focus is on the effects of public-good production
and consumption by the genotypes, which we model using
parameters µj and σji, as follows. For each genotype j,
µj takes its value from {0, 1} and indicates whether j
is a producer of public goods (µj = 1) or not (µj =
0). For each genotype pair i, j, σji takes its value from
the interval [−1, 1] and is used to indicate the degree to
which consuming public goods produced by genotype j
can impact the rate at which genotype i is capable of
multiplying. This degree ranges from a full contribution
toward a slower pace (σji = −1) to a full contribution
toward a faster pace (σji = 1), with neutrality in between
(σji = 0). For j = i, the biological process in question
includes that of bacterial autoinduction.
Whenever µjσji 6= 0, we model the consumption by i
of the public goods produced by j as occurring with prob-
ability uji = u
Jij , where u < 1 is a base probability of
the model and Jij is the number of homologous genes at
which genotypes i and j differ. Expressing uji in this way
takes into account the need for molecular compatibility
between organisms of genotype j and those of genotype
i, and the fact that such compatibility occurs at the level
of the genes of j and i. Thus, lower values of Jji indi-
cate higher compatibility. Jji = 0, in particular, holds
when j = i, so autoinduction occurs with probability 1
whenever µj = 1.
As will become apparent when we give the model’s dy-
namical equations in Sec. II C, we make another strong
simplifying assumption, now regarding the production
and consumption of public goods by the genotypes. The
assumption is that setting µj = 1 for some genotype
j makes the public goods it produces available to all
genotypes in sufficient concentration at all times. That
is to say, we make no provision to model the dynam-
ics of public-good production, diffusion, or consumption.
Our equations are concerned solely with the dynamics of
3genotype proliferation, given a static backdrop of overall
public-good availability.
A. Fitness of a genotype
The quantification of an individual’s fitness in stud-
ies of evolutionary dynamics can be challenging. Ideally,
it should rely on the identification of traits exerting a
quantifiable influence on gene spread through the popu-
lation. This is rarely possible, so it is common for the
difficulty to be sidestepped with the adoption of a proxy,
as some form of distance to an agreed-upon wild type or
the experimental counting of individuals as proliferation
unfolds.
However, the case at hand is exceptional in that,
clearly, a genotype can be said to be as fit as its total
consumption of public goods is beneficial to it. That is,
if genotype j is a producer of public goods (i.e., µj = 1),
then its contribution to the fitness of genotype i should be
an increasing function of σjiu
Jij . It should also depend
on how abundant genotype j is in the entire population,
which immediately makes the fitness of i time-dependent.
Letting Xj denote the absolute abundance of genotype j
at a certain instant and
xj =
Xj∑
k∈N Xk
(1)
its relative abundance (so
∑
j∈N xj = 1), we express the
instantaneous fitness of i by an increasing function of the
convex combination of µjσjiu
Jij over N that uses xj as
the weight of genotype j. We denote this combination
by di, so
di =
∑
j∈N
µjσjiu
Jijxj , (2)
and denote the fitness of genotype i by fi, defining it as
fi = 2
di . Clearly, −1 ≤ di ≤ 1, whence 0.5 ≤ fi ≤ 2.
For di = 0 (the combined public goods instantaneously
available to i are neither beneficial nor detrimental to its
ability to multiply), we have fi = 1. This is convenient in
view of how we incorporate fitness values into the model’s
dynamical equations (cf. Sec. II C).
B. Network structure
A further important element in our model is a sub-
strate on which genotypes can transform into one another
via the mechanisms afforded by mutations and HGT. The
substrate we use is a random graph of node set N (the
set of all 2L distinct genotypes on L nucleotides) and
undirected edges. The existence of an edge between any
two genotypes i and j depends on two base probabilities,
p and r, and has probability
piij = p
Hij + rJij − pHijrJij . (3)
In this expression, Hij is the Hamming distance between
genotypes i and j, i.e., the number of nucleotides at which
they differ. Jij , already introduced at the beginning of
Sec. II, is the number of homologous B-nucleotide genes
at which i and j differ.
Given the value of p, increasing Hij makes it less likely
for the edge joining i and j to exist, reflecting the fact
that the transformation of i into j (or conversely) by
co-occurring mutations at Hij nucleotides becomes less
likely as well. Similarly, given the value of r, increasing
Jij makes joining i and j by an edge less likely, now re-
flecting the also less likely transformation of i into j (or
conversely) by the co-occurring horizontal transfer of Jij
genes. The expression in Eq. (3) comes from assuming
that events of these two types in sample space (muta-
tions and HGT) are independent though not mutually
exclusive.
Regardless of the value of p or r, for i = j we always
have piii = 1 (assuming 0
0 = 1). As a result, every undi-
rected graph G sampled from the random graph given
by Eq. (3) necessarily has self-loops at all genotypes, no
matter how sparsely interconnected the genotypes may
be as a function of p and r.
C. Network dynamics
For a fixed graph G sampled from the random graph
introduced in Sec. II B, we describe the corresponding
network dynamics as a set of 2L coupled differential equa-
tions, one for each possible genotype. These equations
bring together all the elements introduced in Sec. II A,
which led to the definition of the fitness fi = 2
di of
genotype i for di as in Eq. (2), and those introduced in
Sec. II B, where the random graph giving rise to G was
specified via the edge probability piij of Eq. (3) that an
edge exists between genotypes i and j.
The probabilities pHij and rJij appearing in the ex-
pression for piij are, as a matter of principle, expected to
be relevant also to our dynamical equations. If so, they
must appear in the equations in normalized form, as fol-
lows. Letting Ni denote the set of genotypes (including i
itself) to which genotype i is joined by an edge in graph
G, probability pHij becomes
qj→i =
pHij∑
k∈Nj p
Hkj
, (4)
so
∑
i∈Nj qj→i = 1, and similarly probability r
Jij be-
comes
si→j =
rJij∑
k∈Ni r
Jik
, (5)
so
∑
j∈Ni si→j = 1. Probability qj→i is the probability
that genotype j gives rise to genotype i during binary
fission by undergoing mutation at Hij of its nucleotides.
Probability si→j , in turn, is the probability that genotype
4i gives rise to genotype j when Jij genes of genotype i
undergo HGT.
The differential equation describing the evolution in
time of the absolute abundance of genotype i, Xi, is
X˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
qj→ifjXj + λ
∑
j∈Ni
si→jfiXi. (6)
The first summation on the right-hand side of this equa-
tion accounts for the total contribution to X˙i from mu-
tations affecting genotypes j ∈ Ni. The individual con-
tribution from each such j depends on probability qj→i,
on the fitness of genotype j, and on its abundance. The
second summation is similar, now accounting for the to-
tal contribution to X˙i when genes get transferred from
genotype i to genotypes j ∈ Ni via HGT. In Eq. (6), λ
is a parameter that can be used to regulate the relative
rate at which the two types of contribution to X˙i occur.
Because
∑
j∈Ni si→j = 1, Eq. (6) can be immediately
rewritten as
X˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
qj→ifjXj + λfiXi, (7)
where it becomes clear that the second summation on
the right-hand side of Eq. (6) depends only on the fitness
and abundance of genotype i. Thus, the probabilities
rJij giving rise to si→j through Eq. (5) are relevant only
insofar as they affect the sampling of graph G from the
random graph.
In spite of the presumed function of parameter λ in
Eqs. (6) and (7), the simplified equation for X˙i given in
Eq. (7) highlights the fact that the contribution of fiXi to
X˙i is actually multiplied by qi→i+λ. Without λ weighing
in like this, such factor would already be exponentially
higher than that of any other fjXj for p < 1, that is,
for j 6= i we would have qi→i/qj→i = (1/p)Hij . It seems,
therefore, that λ has no clear role to play, so henceforth
we use λ = 0. The final form of the equation for X˙i is
then
X˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
qj→ifjXj . (8)
In order to avoid the unbounded growth of Xi that
Eq. (8) may entail, we rewrite it for the genotypes’ rela-
tive abundances instead. Such abundances are as given
in Eq. (1), i.e., the relative abundance of genotype i is
xi = Xi/
∑
k∈N Xk, so
∑
i∈N xi = 1 holds at all times.
We obtain
x˙i =
X˙i∑
k∈N Xk
− xi
∑
k∈N X˙k∑
k∈N Xk
=
∑
j∈Ni
qj→ifjxj − xi
∑
k∈N
∑
j∈Nk
qj→kfjxj . (9)
Letting
φ =
∑
k∈N
∑
j∈Nk
qj→kfjxj (10)
yields
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
qj→ifjxj − φxi. (11)
Note that, even though this equation embodies the new
nonlinearities implied by the term involving φ, the truly
striking ones are those already present in Eq. (8), that is,
those through which genotype fitnesses depend on rela-
tive abundances exponentially.
III. A SPECIAL CASE WITH ONE SINGLE
PRODUCER
By Eq. (3), letting p = r = 0 implies piij = [i = j].
1
That is, graph G has no edges other than the 2L self-
loops, so by Eq. (4) we have qi→i = 1 for every genotype
i. It might seem that such a trivial topology, implying
as it does that genotypes never undergo any form of ran-
dom variation, would be unable to give rise to interesting
dynamics. This is not necessarily so, however, because
genotypes still influence one another through the close
coupling that their abundance-dependent fitnesses pro-
vide.
Letting
f¯ =
∑
k∈N
fkxk, (12)
it follows from Eq. (10) that φ = f¯ , thus leading, by
Eq. (11), to
x˙i = (fi − f¯)xi. (13)
Here we look at the case in which µi = [i = 0] (geno-
type 0 is the only producer of public goods) and σji =
[j = 0][i 6= 0]σ (all genotypes other than 0 are equally
impacted by the public goods that genotype 0 produces)
for some σ ∈ [−1, 1]. All σji’s with j 6= 0 are irrelevant.
(A similar special case, but with multiple producers of
public goods, is analyzed in the Appendix.)
Assuming xi(0) = 2
−L for every genotype i, Eq. (13)
implies that, in the long run, only the genotypes whose
initial fitnesses are greatest survive. If this happens for
more than one genotype, then all of them survive with
the same abundance. Of all genotypes i 6= 0, identifying
the fittest depends on the value of σ. For σ > 0, the
fittest are the (L/B)(2B−1) genotypes for which J0i = 1.
For σ = 0, all 2L − 1 genotypes have the same fitness.
For σ < 0, the fittest are the (2B − 1)L/B genotypes for
which J0i = L/B. It follows that survival is determined
by how σ00 relates to σu (if σ00 > 0 and σ > 0), or to
1 For a logical proposition P , the Iverson bracket [P ] equals 1 if P
is true, 0 if P is false. This notation generalizes the Kronecker
delta, since [i = j] = δij .
5σuL/B (if σ00 < 0 and σ < 0), or directly to σ (in all
other cases). In general, we denote the greatest fitness
among genotypes i 6= 0 by f+. There are nine cases to
be considered, discussed next. In this discussion, any
conclusion that a group of genotypes i 6= 0 survives is to
be extended to all genotypes i 6= 0 if u = 1, since in this
case they all have the same fitness.
C1. σ00 > 0 and σ > 0: f0 > 1 and f+ > 1, with three
sub-cases:
C1.a. σ00 > σu: f0 > f+; genotype 0 survives.
C1.b. σ00 = σu: f0 = f+; genotype 0 survives, and
so do all genotypes i such that J0i = 1.
C1.c. σ00 < σu: f0 < f+; genotypes i such that
J0i = 1 survive.
C2. σ00 > 0 and σ = 0: f0 > 1 and f+ = 1; genotype 0
survives.
C3. σ00 > 0 and σ < 0: f0 > 1 and f+ < 1; genotype 0
survives.
C4. σ00 = 0 and σ > 0: f0 = 1 and f+ > 1; genotypes
i such that J0i = 1 survive.
C5. σ00 = 0 and σ = 0: f0 = 1 and f+ = 1; all geno-
types survive.
C6. σ00 = 0 and σ < 0: f0 = 1 and f+ < 1; genotype 0
survives.
C7. σ00 < 0 and σ > 0: f0 < 1 and f+ > 1; genotypes
i such that J0i = 1 survive.
C8. σ00 < 0 and σ = 0: f0 < 1 and f+ = 1; genotypes
i 6= 0 survive.
C9. σ00 < 0 and σ < 0: f0 < 1 and f+ < 1, with three
sub-cases:
C9.a. σ00 > σu
L/B : f0 > f+; genotype 0 survives.
C9.b. σ00 = σu
L/B : f0 = f+; genotype 0 survives,
and so do all genotypes i such that J0i = L/B.
C9.c. σ00 < σu
L/B : f0 < f+; genotypes i such that
J0i = L/B survive.
A careful examination of these cases reveals that a
number of outcomes are possible in the long run, which
seems remarkable as we consider that the only edges in
graph G are the self-loops at all genotypes. Interestingly,
these results provide useful insight even when lifting the
p = r = 0 simplification, as we show in Sec. IV.
IV. RESULTS
All our computational results come from time stepping
Eq. (11) from xi(0) = 2
−L for all genotypes i ∈ N . This
is done on a fixed graph G, obtained by Monte Carlo sam-
pling as explained in Sec. II B. The expected steady-state
value of each xi is obtained by averaging over several such
graphs.
A potentially problematic aspect of time stepping
Eq. (11), depending on the case at hand, is the often
very small absolute value of each of the terms contribut-
ing to di in Eq. (2). An issue to be considered is that
several genotypes may have nearly neutral (close to 1)
fitnesses for a long time even if eventually they are to
diverge from one another substantially. In this case, con-
vergence to the steady-state relative abundances can be
slowed down significantly. Another issue is the effect of
the unavoidable round-off errors that accompany opera-
tions on numbers very close to 0. Because of such errors,
the value obtained for di may depend on the order used
for the terms to enter the sum, which can break impor-
tant symmetries whenever the equations dictate that i
and j exist for which we should have di = dj . To avoid
this, at every step the terms that make up di are added
in increasing order of absolute value. Thus, except for
cases involving one single producer, a sorting operation
is required at each step, thus making convergence to the
steady state very slow indeed.
We sidestep these issues by reducing the size and va-
riety of the scenarios we consider while at the same time
retaining the possibility of interesting and diverse behav-
ior. We thus consider only a small number of genotypes:
we use L = 9 and B = 3, hence 512 genotypes, each
with three 3-nucleotide genes. Moreover, all scenarios we
consider generalize the special case of Sec. III by allow-
ing p, r > 0 and therefore the appearance of nontrivial
topologies (that is, those on which manifestations of the
mutational and HGT-related aspects of the model can
occur). All other simplifications of that section continue
to be assumed, so p = r, genotype 0 is the only producer
of public goods, and σ0i = σ for every genotype i 6= 0.
Given these simplifications, the expected behavior of all
nJ =
(
L/B
J
)
(2B − 1)J (14)
genotypes that differ from genotype 0 at J genes is the
same. A handy simplification when analyzing results is
then to consider all such genotypes as a single group,
that is, consider them through their mean relative abun-
dances, denoted by xJ and given by
xJ = n
−1
J
∑
i∈N |J0i=J
xi. (15)
Of course,
∑L/B
J=0 nJxJ = 1.
Given the random graph used to represent our network
of genotypes, the expected degree of a randomly chosen
genotype i (the expected number of edges incident to it,
including its self-loop) can be obtained by summing up
piij (the probability that an edge exists between geno-
types i and j) over j ∈ N . Based on Eq. (3), we write
this summation in terms of the number H of nucleotides
at which i and j may differ and likewise the number J
6of genes at which they may differ. Letting z denote the
desired expected degree, we obtain
z =
L∑
H=0
(
L
H
)
pH +
L/B∑
J=0
nJr
J −
L/B∑
J=0
(
L/B
J
)
rJ
B∑
n1=1
· · ·
B∑
nJ=1
(
B
n1
)
· · ·
(
B
nJ
)
pn1+···+nJ
= (1 + p)L + [1 + (2B − 1)r]L/B
− [1 + [(1 + p)B − 1]r]L/B . (16)
Clearly, increasing p (or r, should it be allowed to change
independently of p) leads z to grow as well, and with it
the expected number of genotypes that can be reached
from genotype i through some undirected path in the
graph.
Such genotypes constitute the so-called connected
component to which i belongs. In the context at hand,
this is the set of genotypes expected to relate to i via
mutation or HGT. For i = 0, this means that probability
p can be used to control the expected extent to which the
behavior of the single producer is evolutionarily related to
those of other genotypes. That is, while all 2L genotypes
partake of the public goods produced by genotype 0, the
set of those that interact with the producer, directly or
indirectly through mutation or HGT, can be shrunk or
enlarged by controlling the value of p. This is illustrated
in Fig. 1, where the expected number of genotypes in the
connected component is denoted by c. Clearly, letting
p ≤ 0.1 suffices for all interesting cases of the connected
component in question to be encompassed. This includes
the case in which it only contains genotype 0, the case in
which it contains a sizable fraction of all 2L genotypes,
and the transition in-between as p grows from p = 0. All
values of p are thus constrained henceforth. (Incidentally,
in this case it can be verified that relaxing the assump-
tion p = r only mildly, e.g., 0.95p ≤ r ≤ 1.05p, causes z
to vary mildly as well, about ±5% for p = 0.1, less for
smaller p. This may help regard the p = r constraint as
not so stringent after all.)
We present our results in two groups of figures, the first
relating to case C1, of Sec. III, with both σ00 > 0 and
σ > 0, the second relating to case C9, with both σ00 < 0
and σ < 0. Note that, in regard to cases C1–C9 of that
section, C1 and C9 are the only nontrivial ones in that
outcomes depend on how parameters other than σ00 and
σ intervene. With only two exceptions, to be discussed
shortly, all figures show the steady-state value of xJ for
J ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Note, in these figures, that because of
their definition in Eq. (15) these four values of xJ do not
in general add up to 1.
All figures in the first group, Figs. 2–5, are for u =
0.01 and σ = 1. Figures 2 and 3 are for p = 0.075,
leading to z ≈ 4.41 and c ≈ 478. Figure 2 is one of the
exceptions alluded to above, since it shows the steady-
state xi’s individually. A similar breakdown is of course
possible in all other cases of this group and the second,
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FIG. 1. (a) Expected degree of a randomly chosen genotype.
(b) Expected fraction of 2L corresponding to the connected
component to which that genotype belongs. Both panels refer
to L = 9 and B = 3.
but is omitted in most of them. Figures 4 and 5 complete
the first group, respectively with p = 0.045 (z ≈ 2.74 and
c ≈ 250) and p = 0.0384 (z ≈ 2.43 and c ≈ 136).
All figures in the second group, Figs. 6–9, are for u =
0.1 and σ = −1. They refer to the same values of p as
the figures in the first group, in the same order. Figure 6
is the second exception alluded to earlier, since it pairs
with Fig. 7 in that the former refers to individual relative
abundances and the latter to mean relative abundances
for the same value of p. Note that the value of u for
all figures in this second group is greater than that of
Figs. 2–5 by one order of magnitude. This is meant to
avoid aggravating the first convergence issue mentioned
at the beginning of this section even further. As discussed
in Sec. V, the critical value of J0i for Figs. 2–5 is J0i = 1,
whereas for Figs. 6–9 it is J0i = L/B = 3, so values of
σ00 closer to 0 are needed.
V. DISCUSSION
The public goods produced by bacteria in QS can be
greatly diverse, including for example enzymes [6] and
vitamins [36], and are therefore essential for a number
of cellular functions related to growth and metabolism.
However, a cell’s production of public goods has costs as-
sociated with it that have the potential to completely off-
set the benefits accrued to the cell itself by autoinduction.
A central factor affecting the tipping of this balance one
way or the other is the presence of certain mutants, com-
monly referred to as “cheaters,” that do not join in the
production of public goods but may nevertheless benefit
from them. Whether the presence of cheater genotypes
can negatively impact the survival of genotypes that do
produce public goods depends on a variety of issues. Ul-
timately, these issues can be summarized as two overall
strategies, one highlighting positive effects on produc-
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FIG. 2. Average steady-state individual relative abundances
(xi) for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.075 (z ≈ 4.41, c ≈ 478),
u = 0.01, and σ = 1. Values of σ00 are 0.001 (a), 0.01 (b), 0.1
(c), and 1 (d). See Fig. 3 for the corresponding mean relative
abundances (xJ).
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FIG. 3. Average steady-state mean relative abundances (xJ)
for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.075 (z ≈ 4.41, c ≈ 478), u = 0.01,
and σ = 1. Values of σ00 are 0.001 (a), 0.01 (b), 0.1 (c),
and 1 (d). See Fig. 2 for the corresponding individual relative
abundances (xi).
ers even if cheaters might be positively affected as well,
the other highlighting negative effects on cheaters even if
producers might be negatively affected as well. The first
(Strategy 1) is autoregulation of the costs versus bene-
fits of public-good production, that is, public goods are
only produced if the latter outweigh the former (cf., e.g.,
[37]). The second (Strategy 2) is the exploitation of some
weakening effect associated with public-good uptake by
cheaters (e.g., [38, 39]). All our computational results
have genotype 0 as the sole producer of public goods and
are therefore focused on the trade-offs affecting the sur-
vival of genotype 0 and all 2L − 1 cheaters.
The first group of results (depicted in Figs. 2–5) is for
σ00, σ > 0 and can be seen as modeling Strategy 1, since
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for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.045 (z ≈ 2.74, c ≈ 250), u = 0.01,
and σ = 1. Values of σ00 are 0.001 (a), 0.01 (b), 0.1 (c), and
1 (d).
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for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.0384 (z ≈ 2.43, c ≈ 136), u = 0.01,
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1 (d).
σ00 > 0 can be taken as indicating that for genotype
0 public-good benefits outweigh production costs, and
σ > 0 as indicating that cheaters benefit from the public
goods without significant hindrance. These results are
for σu = 0.01, so in the absence of any mutational or
HGT-related exchange between genotypes (as in Sec. III,
case C1) we would have a sharp threshold for σ00 at 0.01
separating the exclusive survival of genotype 0 (for σ00
above the threshold) from the exclusive survival of the
n1 = 21 genotypes i having J0i = 1 (for σ00 below the
threshold). For σ00 precisely at the threshold the two
groups would coexist.
Figures 2 and 3 both refer to scenarios in which, on av-
erage, genotype 0 undergoes genetic interactions, directly
or indirectly, with about (478 − 1)/(512 − 1) ≈ 93.3%
of all other genotypes. Figure 2 shows individual rel-
8ative abundances in the long run, Fig. 3 mean relative
abundances. The value of σ00 is varied over three orders
of magnitude from panel (a) through panel (d) in each
figure, leading genotype 0 from a situation of very low
relative abundance for σ00 = 0.001 to one of clear pre-
ponderance for σ00 = 1. All along the competition is
seen to be taking place between genotype 0 (J = 0) and
those that differ from it at exactly J = 1 gene. All other
genotypes are seen to be heading toward perishing. This
progression along the increasing values of σ00 seems to
lead to something resembling the outcome for case C1 of
Sec. III, but there are important differences as well, all
owing to the possibility of genetic interactions between
genotype 0 and the others. One of these differences is
that the J = 1 genotypes never vanish from the scene,
not even as genotype 0 becomes the most abundant one.
Another is that the sharp threshold at σ00 = 0.01 sepa-
rating the demise of genotype 0 from the other regimes
in Sec. III now seems spread over at least two orders of
magnitude.
Figures 4 and 5 show the effect of restricting the pos-
sibilities of genetic interaction with genotype 0, first to
about (250−1)/(512−1) ≈ 48.7% of all other genotypes
(Fig. 4), then to (136 − 1)/(512 − 1) ≈ 26.4% (Fig. 5).
While the overall trends relating the survival of geno-
type 0 to that of the J = 1 genotypes remain the same,
it seems clear that genotype 0 comes ever closer to being
the sole survivor as σ00 is increased and its possibilities
of genetic interaction become limited to a smaller neigh-
borhood in the graph.
The second group of results (depicted in Figs. 6–9) is
for σ00, σ < 0. This group can be regarded as modeling
Strategy 2, with σ00 < 0 reflecting the downside of the
absence of autoregulation (public-good benefits are out-
weighed by production costs) and σ < 0 indicating that
cheaters pay a heavy price for absorbing potentially ben-
eficial public goods without joining in producing them.
Results are now for σuL/B = −0.001, which like be-
fore would constitute a sharp threshold for σ00 at −0.001
should genotypes undergo no mutational or HGT-related
interactions (as in Sec. III, case C9). Now the divide
would be between the exclusive survival of genotype 0
(for σ00 above the threshold) and the exclusive survival
of the n3 = 343 genotypes i having Ji0 = 3 (for σ00 below
the threshold). Coexistence would ensue for σ00 precisely
at the threshold.
In each of Figs 6–9 the value of σ00 is increased by one
order of magnitude from panel (a) to panel (b), then by
one more from panel (b) to panel (c). Along these in-
creases the competition for survival takes place between
genotype 0 and those that differ from it at exactly J = 3
genes. All other genotypes are heading toward perishing.
In all four figures the genotypes having J = 3 survive
alone for σ00 = −0.01. For larger values of σ00 genotype
0 is seen to survive as well, becoming the most abundant
one for σ00 = −0.0001. As σ00 is thus increased a tran-
sition similar to that of case C9 of Sec. III takes place,
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FIG. 6. Average steady-state individual relative abundances
(xi) for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.075 (z ≈ 4.41, c ≈ 478), u = 0.1,
and σ = −1. Values of σ00 are −0.01 (a), −0.001 (b), and
−0.0001 (c). See Fig. 7 for the corresponding mean relative
abundances (xJ).
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FIG. 7. Average steady-state mean relative abundances (xJ)
for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.075 (z ≈ 4.41, c ≈ 478), u = 0.1,
and σ = −1. Values of σ00 are −0.01 (a), −0.001 (b), and
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the corresponding individual relative abundances (xi).
but once again this happens much less abruptly, along at
least one order of magnitude.
As with the first group of figures, moving from Figs. 6
and 7 to Fig. 8 and then to Fig. 9 allows us to track
the effects of letting genotype 0 interact genetically with
progressively fewer other genotypes, from about 93.3%
of them in Figs. 6 and 7, to about 48, 7% in Fig. 8, then
about 26.4% in Fig. 9. Clearly, as genotype 0 becomes
more confined in its possibilities for genetic interaction,
so does its prevalence relative to the J = 3 genotypes
become more pronounced.
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FIG. 8. Average steady-state mean relative abundances (xJ)
for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.045 (z ≈ 2.74, c ≈ 250), u = 0.1,
and σ = −1. Values of σ00 are −0.01 (a), −0.001 (b), and
−0.0001 (c). Note the different ordinate scales.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the evolutionary dynamics of bacterial
QS when multiple species (here referred to as genotypes)
participate. We have focused on the production and up-
take of public goods by the cells and on the trade-offs
arising when cheater genotypes (those that have the po-
tential to benefit from the uptake of public goods but
do not join in producing them) are present. Our model
has a number of parameters intended to allow for several
scenarios to be considered. Two probability parameters
(p, r) are related to how genotypes interact genetically,
and another (u) is related to how molecular compatibility
between genotypes influences the uptake by one genotype
of public goods produced by another. Further parame-
ters specify which genotypes are producers (the µi’s) and
whether (and how strongly) public-good uptake is detri-
mental or beneficial to a genotype’s fitness (the σji’s).
All our computational results refer to genotype 0 being
the sole producer, all others being cheaters. All cheaters
would be equally affected by the uptake of the public
goods produced by genotype 0 if this only depended on
the σ0i’s (i.e., all σ0i’s equal some fixed σ), but the ac-
tion of parameter u causes significant differentiation. For
fixed genotype and gene sizes, we have found that the
long-term survival of genotype 0 depends chiefly on how
σ00 stands relative to a function of σ and u (though pa-
rameters p and r also have a part to play). Our analytical
results in the Appendix suggest that a similar conclusion
may come to hold when multiple producers are consid-
ered.
Our model can be easily adapted, mainly by altering
the modes of genetic interaction between genotypes, to
the study of QS in other microorganisms (e.g., fungi [40]).
In fact, to varying degrees the molecule-mediated com-
munication that characterizes QS in microorganisms is
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FIG. 9. Average steady-state mean relative abundances (xJ)
for L = 9, B = 3, p = 0.0384 (z ≈ 2.43, c ≈ 136), u = 0.1,
and σ = −1. Values of σ00 are −0.01 (a), −0.001 (b), and
−0.0001 (c). Note the different ordinate scales.
observed also in other biological systems, from simple in-
fectious agents such as viruses [41], to communities of
so-called artificial cells [42], to precursor-cell clusters as
they differentiate into specific organs and tissues (some-
times with surprisingly accurate global results; cf., e.g.,
[43]). We expect that also in some of these systems the
analysis of long-term global behavior could benefit from
the development of models closely related to the one we
have presented.
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Appendix: A special case with multiple producers
The special case of Sec. III can be extended to al-
low multiple producers of public goods while remaining
tractable as far as predicting behavior in the long run is
concerned. While studying multiple-producer scenarios
computationally has proven infeasible given the resources
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we can presently access, the special case we analyze in
this appendix serves to illustrate a more complex situ-
ation in which the fate of producers and certain other
genotypes continues to be determined, in the nontrivial
cases, by a comparison between some producer k’s σkk
and a threshold.
The extension of Sec. III we now present preserves the
p = r = 0 assumption of that section, so graph G con-
tinues to have only self-loops for edges and the dynamics
continues to be given by Eq. (13). For uniform initial
abundances, which we continue to assume, survival in
the long run continues to occur for the initially fittest
genotypes only, always with the same abundance.
Let P be the set of producers, i.e., µi = [i ∈ P ]. As-
sume L/B ≥ 2 (at least two genes per genotype) and let g
be a fixed gene out of a genotype’s L/B genes. The mul-
tiple producers that we consider are the 2B genotypes
that differ from one another only at gene g. It follows
that every genotype i /∈ P must agree with exactly one
genotype ki ∈ P at gene g and differ from all the 2B − 1
other genotypes in P at this same gene. Therefore, for
some Jiki ∈ {1, . . . , L/B − 1}, genotype i differs from
producer ki at Jiki genes and from all other producers at
Jiki + 1 genes.
Similarly to how we proceeded in Sec. III, here we as-
sume either σji = [j ∈ P ][i /∈ P ]σ or σji = [j ∈ P ][i ∈
P ][i 6= j]σp, with σ, σp ∈ [−1, 1], depending on whether
i ∈ P . That is, for k ∈ P , genotype i 6= k is impacted by
the public goods that genotype k produces either through
σki = σ (if i /∈ P ) or through σki = σp (if i ∈ P ). We
also assume σkk = σpp with σpp ∈ [−1, 1] for all k ∈ P .
All σji’s with j /∈ P are irrelevant. It follows that ev-
ery genotype k ∈ P has the same value for xk, dk, and
fk, which we henceforth denote by xp, dp, and fp. With
these settings in place, by Eq. (2) we have
dp = σppxp + (2
B − 1)σpuxp (A.1)
and
di = σu
Jkiixp + (2
B − 1)σuJkii+1xp (A.2)
for i /∈ P .
For σ > 0, the fittest genotypes i /∈ P are such that
JJkii = 1. Comparing fp to f+ depends on how σpp
relates to
α =
[
1− (2B − 1)
(σp
σ
− u
)]
σu, (A.3)
which for σpp > 0 and σp < [(2
B − 1)−1 + u]σ (to ensure
α > 0) extends case C1 of Sec. III. The resulting case is
as follows.
D1. σpp > 0, σ > 0, and σp < [(2
B−1)−1 +u]σ: fp > 1
and f+ > 1, with three sub-cases:
D1.a. σpp > α: fp > f+; genotypes k ∈ P survive.
D1.b. σpp = α: fp = f+; genotypes k ∈ P survive,
and so do all genotypes i /∈ P such that Jkii =
1.
D1.c. σpp < α: fp < f+; genotypes i /∈ P such that
Jkii = 1 survive.
Case C9 can be extended similarly by first noting that
for σ < 0 the fittest genotypes i /∈ P are such that JJkii =
L/B − 1. It follows that comparing fp to f+ depends on
the relationship between σpp and
β =
[
1− (2B − 1)
( σp
σuL/B−2
− u
)]
σuL/B−1. (A.4)
The desired extension comes from assuming σpp < 0 and
σp > [(2
B − 1)−1 +u]σuL/B−2 (to ensure β < 0). It is as
follows.
D9. σpp < 0, σ < 0, and σp > [(2
B−1)−1 +u]σuL/B−2:
fp < 1 and f+ < 1, with three sub-cases:
D9.a. σpp > β: fp > f+; genotypes k ∈ P survive.
D9.b. σpp = β: fp = f+; genotypes k ∈ P survive,
and so do all genotypes i /∈ P such that Jkii =
L/B − 1.
D9.c. σpp < β: fp < f+; genotypes i /∈ P such that
Jkii = L/B − 1 survive.
The trivial cases of Sec. III (cases C2–C8) can be ex-
tended similarly. Of course, allowing for σp and σ to
relate to each other differently will lead to further varia-
tions.
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